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ABSTRACT
An adversarial attack is an algorithm that perturbs the input of a ma-
chine learning model in an intelligent way in order to change the
output of the model. An important property of adversarial attacks
is transferability. According to this property, it is possible to gener-
ate adversarial perturbations on one model and apply it the input to
fool the output of a different model. Our work focuses on studying
the transferability of adversarial attacks in sound event classification.
We are able to demonstrate differences in transferability properties
from those observed in computer vision. We show that dataset nor-
malization techniques such as z-score normalization does not affect
the transferability of adversarial attacks and we show that techniques
such as knowledge distillation do not increase the transferability of
attacks.
Index Terms— Adversarial attacks, transferability, audio tag-
ging, sound event classification
1. INTRODUCTION
Adversarial attacks are algorithms that add a small perturbation to
the input of a machine learning model in order to change the output.
The perturbed inputs are called adversarial examples. An interest-
ing property of adversarial examples is that they can be transferred
between machine learning models [1]. In computer vision, research
shows that adversarial attacks can transfer between different model
architectures, datasets and machine learning types [2, 3].
The transferability of adversarial attacks implies that a machine
learning model is not safe even if the model architecture and model
weights are kept hidden. Transferability also implies similarities in
the underlying feature representation of different machine learning
models, even if they have different model architectures and model
types.
Adversarial attacks can be broadly classified into perfect-
knowledge attacks and limited-knowledge attacks [3]. In a perfect-
knowledge scenario, the adversarial attack has complete knowledge
about the classifier and training data–and can use this knowledge
to directly fool the classifier by computing gradients or using some
other optimization algorithm if the classifier is not differentiable. In
a limited-knowledge scenario, that adversarial attack has access to
some information, such as the training data or model architecture,
but may not have access to the model weights; therefore, the attack
has to try and imitate the target classifier using another machine
learning model. The model we want to attack is called the target
This work has received funding from the EU’s Horizon 2020 research
and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agree-
ment No. 765068. EB is supported by RAEng Research Fellowship RF/128.
model and the model we generate adversarial attacks on to transfer
to the target model is called the substitute model.
In computer vision, generating adversarial examples in the
limited-knowledge setting is proven to be possible [3, 2]. In these
experiments, it is assumed that there is no knowledge of the training
data or model architecture and that only a limited amount of queries
are possible on the target model. Despite all these restrictions, they
are able to generate adversarial attacks consistently and reliably. In
sound event classification, Esmailpour et al. [4] carried out stud-
ies on transferability of adversarial attacks between Support Vector
Machines (SVM) and deep learning models. Their research does
not delve into transferability between deep learning models. In the
perfect-knowledge scenario, there is a growing body of work in
automatic speech recognition that focuses on generating adversarial
attacks unique for speech recognition [5, 6, 7, 8]. In sound event
classification and music, there is research that demonstrates the ex-
istence of perfect-knowledge attacks as well [9, 10]. Given the lack
of research in sound event classification on adversarial attacks, it is
important to gain an understanding of the properties of adversarial
attacks using the domain knowledge of the field. Yang et al. [11]
explain how the temporal aspects of automatic speech recognition
and differences in the setup of speech recognition systems change
some of the properties of adversarial attacks. Since very little work
exists on transferability in sound event classification, we perform
transferability experiments across deep learning models where the
attack has knowledge of the dataset but not knowledge of the model
architecture. The main contributions of our work include:
1. Observing the effects of input transformations on the trans-
ferability of adversarial attacks.
2. Investigating whether knowledge distillation [12] can be used
to learn the weaknesses of the teacher model.
3. Investigating whether z-score normalization across the dataset
during training affects transferability.
4. Identifying patterns in the audio files that are exhibiting the
transferability property.
2. METHOD
2.1. Datasets
The dataset for all the experiments in this work is the FSDKag-
gle2018 dataset [13] that was released for task 2 of the DCASE 2018
challenge on “General-purpose audio tagging of Freesound content
with AudioSet labels”. The dataset has 41 labels and it is a single
label classification task. The labels range from musical instruments
such as snare drum and clarinet to urban sounds such as bus and gun-
shots. There are roughly 9K audio files in the training data and 1.6K
Model Training Test
VGG13 0.9714 0.8093
CRNN 0.9768 0.8437
GCNN 0.9803 0.8437
dense mel 0.9876 0.89875
dense wav 0.9698 0.86125
Table 1. Model accuracy on training and test data.
audio files in the test data. The test data is used in our experiments
to generate adversarial attacks.
2.2. Deep learning models
The deep learning models used in this work are from groups that par-
ticipated in task 2 of the DCASE 2018 challenge [13]. From Iqbal et
al. [14], we use the VGG13, CRNN and GCNN architectures. The
VGG13 model is a convolutional model with a fully connected layer
at the end. The CRNN model is a convolutional recurrent neural net-
work that replaces the fully connected layer at the end of the VGG13
model with a bi-directional recurrent layer. The GCNN model is a
gated convolutional neural network that replaces the normal convo-
lutions in the VGG13 with gated convolutions. All models have a log
mel-spectrogram input with a window size of 1024, hop size of 512,
and 64 mel bands between 0-16kHz. The log mel-spectrogram of
each input is normalized by the absolute maximum value of that par-
ticular input’s log mel-spectrogram and is z-score normalized across
the training data.
From Jeong and Lim [15], we use the densenet models. The
densenet architecture uses dense layers where the input is concate-
nated with the output to improve the gradient flow. There are two
versions of the densenet model, the log mel-spectrogram version
(dense mel) and the raw audio version (dense wav). The log mel-
spectrogram version has a window size of 1024, a hop size of 128
and 64 mel bands between 0-16kHz. Batch normalization is applied
to the raw audio before it is passed to the log mel-spectrogram layer.
All the models use audio sampled at 32kHz. All models use mixup
augmentation [16] while training. Model performance on the FSD-
Kaggle2018 training and test data is shown in Table 1.
2.3. Adversarial attack
We use the Carlini and Wagner attack [17] which uses the L2 as a
regularizer to reduce the perturbation added to the input. The goal
of an adversarial attack can be to generate a targeted attack or an
untargeted attack. A targeted attack is where the algorithm is trying
to fool the classifier into a specific target label. An untargeted attack
is where the algorithm is trying to minimize the output probability
of the current label until the output prediction changes. The untar-
geted attack does not care about what label the classifier is fooled
to. We formalize the Carlini and Wagner attack as follows. Assume
the input to classifier C is x, δ is the input perturbation, f is some
function and c is a constant:
Minimize L2(x, x+ δ) + c · f(x+ δ)
such that x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n
The purpose of the function f is to simplify the the optimization
problem [17, 1]. In our work f is defined as:
C(x+ δ) = t is true if f(x+ δ) ≤ 0
f(x′) = (max(Z(x′)i)− Z(x′)t)+ i 6= t
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Fig. 1. Block diagram for all the experimental setups.
Z denotes the logits layer of the classifier, t is the target class and
x′ = x+δ. We only use the targeted version of the Carlini and Wag-
ner attack. The target label for each audio file is selected randomly
ensuring that the target label is different from the ground truth.
There is a trade-off between generating adversarial attacks
quickly and generating the best adversarial attack for an audio file
by hyperparameter tuning. We are more interested in generating
adversarial attacks quickly. In order to speed up the generation of
adversarial attacks we stop optimization once the signal-to-noise ra-
tio (SNR) becomes lower than 20dB, once the output probability of
the target model is higher than 0.95 or once the number of iterations
exceeds 5000.
3. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
The general experimental setup is shown in Fig. 1. There is a model
on which we generate adversarial examples; we call this model the
substitute model. Then we observe how the generated adversarial ex-
amples transfer to the other models. The other models are called the
target models. In each experiment, we alter the substitute model and
try to observe the changes in how adversarial examples are trans-
ferred to the target models. The target models are from the list of
CRNN, GCNN, dense mel and dense wav.
The audio files of interest for these experiments are the inter-
section of audio files on which adversarial attacks were successfully
generated on the substitute model and the audio files that were cor-
rectly classified by the target model. The correct% refers to the
percentage audio files in the test data that are audio files of interest.
The transfer% refers to the percentage of adversarial attacks on the
audio files of interest that fool the target model. The target% refers
to the percentage of adversarial attacks on the audio files of inter-
est that fool the target model such that the output label of the target
model is the same as the substitute model for the adversarial attack.
3.1. Experiment 1
In the first experiment, the VGG13 model is the substitute model
and the training configuration is the same as the original paper [14].
Target model Transfer% Target% Correct%
CRNN 41.4 23.64 84.65
GCNN 43.9 30.6 84.72
dense mel 8.9 0.2 90.26
dense wav 4.5 0.2 83.90
Table 2. Experiment 1: Baseline system with VGG13 substitute
model
Target model Transfer% Target% Correct%
CRNN 43.1 9.2 85.02
GCNN 37.5 8.5 84.88
dense mel 12.2 0.5 90.32
dense wav 6.1 0.2 83.75
Table 3. Experiment 2: Knowledge distillation using dense mel out-
put to train VGG13
We generate adversarial attacks on the VGG13 model and evaluate
the attacks on the CRNN, GCNN, dense mel and dense wav models.
This experiment serves as baseline towards observing the percentage
of adversarial attack transfer. We are interested in observing whether
different architectures affect transferability. We were able to gener-
ate 1479 adversarial attacks out of the 1600 test audio files on the
substitute model. The results of the transferability of attacks can be
seen in Table 2.
Transferability is high between the VGG13 model and the
CRNN and GCNN models at ∼40%, but it fails for both con-
figurations of the dense models. Between the dense models, the
transferability is better to the dense mel model, which also has a log
mel-spectrogram input. This suggests that the adversarial attacks
are less likely to transfer if the input representation is different. It
is interesting that the adversarial examples transfer successfully be-
tween the VGG13 and CRNN model because the adversarial attack
has no knowledge of recurrent layers or their gradients. The target%
shows similar trends to the transfer%. The numbers are predictably
lower for target% due to the extra condition as described at the start
of section 3.
3.2. Experiment 2
Experiment 2 modifies the VGG13 substitute model to try and im-
prove the transferability of adversarial attacks on the target models.
By using knowledge distillation [12] we aim to impart more knowl-
edge of the target models to the substitute model. In knowledge dis-
tillation, one model is trained on the soft labels of the other model.
In this experiment, we train two VGG13 models–one using the soft
labels of the dense mel and one using the soft labels of the CRNN.
We do not use mixup augmentation [16] while training.
The VGG13 model trained on the dense mel labels successfully
generated adversarial attacks on 1416 out of the 1600 test audio files
and the VGG13 model trained on the CRNN labels successfully gen-
erated adversarial attacks on 1414 out of the 1600 test audio files.
Results are shown in Tables 3 and 4.
There is a slight improvement in the transfer% to the dense mel
when the VGG13 model is trained with the soft labels of the
dense mel but a similar improvement did not happen for trans-
ferability to the CRNN when training the VGG13 with the CRNN
labels. On contrary, using knowledge distillation with the CRNN
labels decreased the target% on the CRNN and GCNN models by a
large amount. We take a closer look at these results in the discussion
Target model Transfer% Target% Correct%
CRNN 41.4 9.2 84.72
GCNN 36.7 9.5 84.86
Table 4. Experiment 2: Knowledge distillation using CRNN output
to train VGG13
Target model Transfer% Target% Correct%
CRNN 38.9 21.5 84.72
GCNN 41.9 30.4 84.79
Table 5. Experiment 3 with VGG13 as substitute model trained on
no z-score normalization.
section to try and explain the observations with more clarity.
3.3. Experiment 3
Normalizing data across the training set is a common machine learn-
ing technique. The VGG13, CRNN and GCNN models use z-score
normalization while training. We change the VGG13 substitute
model by training it without z-score normalization. The attack was
successful on 1480 of the 1600 test audio files. The results are
shown in Table 5. Both the transfer% and the target% are more or
less unchanged from when the substitute model was trained with
z-score normalization. This suggests that the features learned by the
deep learning models are similar irrespective of if they are trained
with z-score normalization.
4. DISCUSSION
The experiments and results give us a broad overview of the trans-
ferability of adversarial attacks. In this section, we look for patterns
in the type of audio files that are transferred.
4.1. SNR and output probability
Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is computed using the original audio file
from the test dataset as the signal and the perturbation added by the
adversarial attack as the noise. If the SNR is lower, it means more
perturbation was added to generate the adversarial attack. Intuitively,
the more noisy a signal is, the more likely the adversarial attack will
succeed. Similarly, if the targeted model is highly confident (prob-
able) in its prediction on the original audio file, it might reduce the
chance of an adversarial attack changing its prediction. Table 7 plots
the data of the output probabilities on the original audio files of in-
terest and the SNR of the adversarial attacks on the audio files of
interest.
From the results, there is a clear positive correlation between
the output probability of the substitute and target model with the
successful transferability of the adversarial attack. While there is a
small difference in the average SNR between the successfully trans-
ferred and failed adversarial attacks, the standard deviation for both
is around 6dB. The larger standard deviation suggests that the small
difference in SNR does not mean much.
4.2. Label-wise performance
So far, we have looked at the transferability properties without fo-
cusing on specific labels. It is possible that some labels transfer at
a much higher rate than other labels. Ideally, we expect that trans-
ferability should be independent of labels and that the transferability
Target First(transfer%) Second(transfer%) Third(transfer%)
Substitute model: original vgg13 model
CRNN Fireworks(88) Double bass(70) Squeak(70)
GCNN Drawer(85) Electric piano(80) Gong(76)
dense mel Electric piano(40.62) Flute(33.96) Clarinet(25.92)
dense wav Cello(20.00) Hi-hat(17.64) Gong(13.33)
Substitute model: vgg13 trained with densenet mel labels
dense mel Flute(56.60) Electric piano(43.75) Hi-hat(32.26)
CRNN Fireworks(94.74) Trumpet(90.62) Flute(72.22)
GCNN Flute(80.39) Electric piano(73.33) Fireworks(72.22)
Substitute model: vgg13 trained with crnn labels
CRNN Fireworks(100) Trumpet(90.62) Flute(84.31)
GCNN Fireworks(92.30) Cello(75.55) Flute(72.55)
Table 6. Top-3 labels’ transferability under different substitute models.
VGG13 prob. Target prob. SNR(dB)
target s f s f s f
CRNN 0.50 0.65 0.59 0.74 28.27 29.72
GCNN 0.50 0.66 0.52 0.70 28.62 29.30
dense mel 0.48 0.58 0.79 0.92 28.84 29.06
dense wav 0.49 0.58 0.57 0.90 26.55 28.94
Table 7. Comparing the average SNR and output probability of the
substitute and target model on adversarial attacks that transferred
successfully (s) and failed to transfer (f).
Fig. 2. Label distribution of the ground truth labels and the substitute
model’s adversarial labels.
per label should be close to the overall rate of transferability. In order
to understand this better, we analyze the relationship of the ground
truth labels from the test dataset and the adversarial target labels of
the substitute model with transferability. Figure 2 shows the label
distribution of the ground truth labels and the adversarial target la-
bels of the substitute model.
The test dataset of FSDKaggle2018 does not have a uniform dis-
tribution between classes. Label numbers 30 and 39 have over 80
audio files when the average number per label is around 30. The tar-
get labels have a more uniform distribution because they are selected
randomly. Table 6 shows the top 3 labels’ transferability between the
substitute model and the target model.
We can see that certain labels perform much better than the av-
erage performance such as Fireworks, Electric piano, Flute etc. It
is interesting that there seems to be a specific set of labels that is
more transferable. The CRNN is consistently fooled by Fireworks,
the GCNN by the Electric piano etc.
Table 6 sheds more clarity on what knowledge distillation is do-
ing. The broader results from Experiment 2 implies that knowledge
distillation does not succeed in imparting meaningful knowledge to
the substitute model. However, we can now see that knowledge dis-
tillation improves the transferability on certain labels. For example
the VGG13 was already fooling Electric piano and Flute the most
against the dense mel model, but training with the dense mel labels
improved the ability to fool these labels from 40.62% to 43.75% and
33.96% to 56.60% respectively. In fact, this ability to fool those par-
ticular labels more spills over to fooling the CRNN and GCNN. With
this VGG13 model, Flute is suddenly much more transferable for the
CRNN and GCNN models. Similarly, training with the CRNN labels
improves the Fireworks and Flute performance on the CRNN and
make Fireworks the most transferable for the GCNN model. This
suggests that there are label specific features that are being exploited
to generate adversarial attacks.
5. CONCLUSION
The results suggest that the transferability of adversarial attacks is
affected by the input transformation. When the input transformation
is identical, it is similar to the transferability experiments in com-
puter vision and there is transferability between models. When the
hyperparameters of the input transform are different, as in the case
of the dense mel, or the input representation is completely different,
as in the case of the dense wav, the transferability is almost non-
existent. However, z-score normalization of the input does not seem
to affect the transferability of adversarial attacks. Using knowledge
distillation to learn the features of another deep learning model does
not affect transferability as well, however a closer analysis of the im-
provement in transferability at the label level suggests that there is
some part of the features that is being learned.
This paper scratches the surface of adversarial attacks in sound
event classification. There is obvious room for improvement to in-
crease both the transfer% and target%. It is important to improve
the transferability of adversarial attacks so that we can understand
the security threats that a sound event classification are going to
face when deployed in the real world. From an interpretability per-
spective, future work will focus on disentangling the complicated
relationship between model architecture, input representations and
training data.
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